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ABSTRACT
Many content-based retrieval systems (CBIRS) describe im-
ages using the SIFT local features because of their very ro-
bust recognition capabilities. While SIFT features proved to
cope with a wide spectrum of general purpose image distor-
tions, its security has not fully been assessed yet. In one of
their scenario, Hsu et al. in [2] show that very specific anti-
SIFT attacks can jeopardize the keypoint detection. These
attacks can delude systems using SIFT targeting application
such as image authentication and (pirated) copy detection.
Having some expertise in CBIRS, we were extremely con-
cerned by their analysis. This paper presents our own inves-
tigations on the impact of these anti-SIFT attacks on a real
CBIRS indexing a large collection of images. The attacks
are indeed not able to break the system. A detailed analysis
explains this assessment.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.1 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Content
Analysis and Indexing
General Terms
Algorithms, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Content-based image retrieval systems (CBIRS) are now
quite mature. They typically use advanced multidimen-
sional indexing technique and powerful low-level visual de-
scriptors, making them both efficient and effective at return-
ing the images from a database that are similar to query
images. An abundant literature describes such systems and
evaluates their ability to match images despite severe dis-
tortions [3]. Such good recognition capabilities are essen-
tially due to distinctive local features computed over im-
ages, the most popular example being the SIFT descrip-
tors [5]. CBIRS are used in many applications, including
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security oriented scenarios like copyright enforcement and
image forensics.
So far, it is mostly the robustness of CBIRS that has been
evaluated. In contrast, very few works investigate their se-
curity level. Security of CBIRS is challenged when pirates
mount attacks after having accumulated a deep knowledge
about a particular system, focusing on very specific parts
where flaws have been identified. This security perspective
recently gained interest in the multimedia community.
In 2009, a paper by Hsu et al. [2] discusses extremely
specific anti-SIFT attacks potentially making it hard for a
CBIRS to subsequently match the attacked images with the
ones from the database. In a copy detection scenario, this
would allow illegal material to remain undetected. This is
an extremely serious threat, as so many real life systems use
such visual features. Hsu et al. use this claim to motivate
an encryption mechanism securing the SIFT description. We
immediately decided to rerun their experiments against our
own system, in realistic settings, to assess the seriousness of
their conclusions.
Surprisingly, after carefully implementing their anti-SIFT
attacks and running similar experiments, we were able to
draw very different conclusions. While [2] suggests a SIFT-
based system can be broken, we could not break our system,
that is, attacked images were still matched with their orig-
inal version. We then decided to undertake a deep investi-
gation of the phenomenons at stake.
This paper makes the following contribution: it provides
an in depth analysis of what happens when performing the
“Keypoint Removal” attack, which is central to one scenario
in [2]. In particular, this paper shows removing keypoints
triggers the creation of new and undesired keypoints that
are easy to match.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the
material from [2] that is needed to understand the remain-
der of this paper. Section 3 describes our set up and the real
life experiments we did, which turned out to contradict [2].
Section 4 describes in details what happens when removing
keypoints as in [2]. That section also provides quite exten-
sive details on the new and undesired keypoints created as
a side effect of removals. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. ROBUST AND SECURE SIFT
The main contribution of [2] is a secure implementation
of the SIFT description. To motivate this, its authors first
exhibit specific attacks modifying the image only around the
detected keypoints to conceal them.
A keypoint (x, y, σ) is detected when it yields a local ex-
tremum over its neighborhood of the DoG (Difference of
Gaussians) function D(x, y, σ), which is the convolution of
the image I by the difference Gd,σ of two Gaussian smooth-
ing kernels at scales σ and kσ: D(x, y, σ) = Gd,σ ⋆ I(x, y).
We denote by D(x1, y1, σ) a local extremum value, and by
D(x2, y2, σ) the second extremum in its spatial neighbor-
hood. The following difference d is thus positive if the ex-
tremum is a maximum (resp. negative for a minimum):
d = D(x1, y1, σ)−D(x2, y2, σ)
=
∑
(u,v)∈R1
I(u, v)Gd,σ(u− x1, v − y1)
−
∑
(u,v)∈R2
I(u, v)Gd,σ(u− x2, v − y2),
whereRi is the support of the convolution kernel Gd,σ trans-
lated by (xi, yi), i ∈ {1, 2}.
The idea of [2] is to locally add a patch ǫ to create the
attacked image Im = I+ǫ, such that d is now null when cal-
culated on Im. There is no longer a unique local extremum
at this point and therefore the keypoint has been successfully
removed. The authors propose the following patch:
ǫ(x, y) =


−d/|D1|Gd,σ(x− x1, y − y1) if (x, y) ∈ D1
d/|D2|Gd,σ(x− x2, y − y2) if (x, y) ∈ D2
0 otherwise
where Di = Ri−R1 ∩R2, i ∈ {1, 2}, |Di| is its size in pixel.
A ratio α > 0 controls the keypoint removal rate: the patch
is applied if |ǫ(x, y)| ≤ αI(x, y), ∀(x, y) ∈ D1 ∪ D2.
Some experimental results measure the efficiency of the
attack by evaluating its distortion by the PSNR between I
and Im when a certain percentage of the keypoints have been
removed (from 90 to 10%) over three images (Lena, Baboon,
and Bridge). Their secure implementation processes the im-
age with a secret keyed transformation prior to the keypoint
detection. This prevents the above attack since the pirate
ignoring this secret can no longer locate the keypoints. A
final experiment assesses that the robustness of the keypoint
detector is not affected by the secret keyed transform. To
this end, a database of 1,940 modified images (using the
Stirmark benchmark) is built. When an original image is
queried, their system almost always retrieved all the corre-
sponding modified images. Another experiment shows how
to defeat an image authentication scheme based on robust
hash by inserting tampered areas having similar SIFT key-
points. We are not analyzing this last scenario since our
paper only focuses on threats upon CBIR systems.
3. REAL TESTS AND CONTRADICTIONS
This section describes our experiments using a real CBIRS
when trying to reproduce the results of [2]. We therefore
carefully implemented their keypoint removal strategy, re-
ferred to as KPR-based attacks.
3.1 Algorithms for Description and Indexing
We computed the local SIFT descriptors using the open-
source SIFT-VLFeat code by Vedaldi [6]. We did several
experiments to get descriptors that are as close as possible
to the original SIFT computed using Lowe’s binary, both
in terms of number of descriptors and of spatial location in
images. In our case, the best configuration is when peak-
thresh=4 and edge-thresh=12.
All the descriptors of the image collection are then pro-
cessed by the NV-Tree high-dimensional indexing scheme [4].
The NV-Tree runs approximate k-nearest neighbor queries
and has been specifically designed to index large collections
of local descriptors.
3.2 Dataset and Queries
Our image collection is composed of 100,000 random pic-
tures downloaded from Flickr that are very diverse in con-
tents. All images have been resized to 512 pixels on their
longer edge. This collection yields 103,454,566 SIFT-VLFeat
descriptors indexed by the NV-Tree. We then randomly
picked 1,000 of these images and performed 7 KPR-attacks
on them with α ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1.5, 3, 6, 12}.1 For compari-
son, we also applied 49 standard Stirmark attacks (rotations,
crops, filters, scalings, affine transforms, . . . ). Overall, there
are 56,000 queries distributed in 56 families. This experi-
mental protocol clearly targets a copy detection scenario.
3.3 Copy Detection Experiments
For all queries we kept track of the scores of the 100 best
matching images. Fig. 1 illustrates the outcome of this ex-
periment by selecting the 7 KPR-attacks as well as 3 Stir-
mark attacks. The score of the original image decreases as
fewer keypoints remain after the attacks. The score of the
best non matching image does not vary as it corresponds
to (a stable number of) random matches. It clearly shows
that the system works for all attacks.2 Note also that the
original images are always found when querying with any of
the KPR-based attacked images. In other words, it is not
possible to conceal images from the system when performing
the anti-SIFT attacks of [2]. Indeed, this surprising result is
backed-up by the facts revealed in the following analysis.
4. ANALYSIS
This section investigates why we were not able to con-
firm the results of [2] in a CBIRS context. We closely look
at what happens when performing KPR-based attacks, and
explain why attacked and original images still match. We
use the Lena image as a vehicle for providing explanations;
we observed and report similar phenomenons when using
1,000 random images, however.
4.1 Removal of Keypoints
Let us apply the patch ǫ of Sect. 2 at a particular position
(x1, y1) of the Lena image. It was originally detected as a
keypoint because of its local maximum at scale σ = 1.37.
Fig. 2(a) shows the DoG local extrema originally detected,
identified on the figure by a blue square, and the second
extrema in its neighborhood (green circle). After attack
(x1, y1) is no longer an extremum as the original first and
second local extrema values are now quite equals (Fig. 2(b)).
Fig. 3(a) shows what this particular patch looks like in
the neighborhood R1 ∪ R2 of (x1, y1). It introduces strong
1These values are the ones best reproducing the keypoint
removal rates used in [2].
2None of the Stirmark attack produced concealment.
Table 1: Number of deleted and new created keypoints after KPR-attacks for different values of keypoint
removal ratio α on Lena and Baboon images, and average values computed over the 1,000 query images.
Image Total # α % KP # KP # KP # KP after % KP created in PSNR
name of KP deleted deleted created attack attacked image
LENA 1218 0.2 20% 245 188 1161 16% 48.98
LENA 1218 12 90% 1093 756 881 86% 32.49
BABOON 3124 0.2 19% 590 418 2952 14% 43.24
BABOON 3124 12 92% 2865 1639 1898 86% 27.51
AVG ON 1000 IM 1034 0.2 14% 149 109 994 11% 50.81
AVG ON 1000 IM 1034 12 84% 871 605 768 79% 32.42
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Figure 1: Image scores in realistic settings. X-axis:
10 selected attacks. Y-axis: for each family of at-
tacks, the average scores over the 1,000 queries of
the original images (expected to be matched) and of
non matching images having the highest score.
Table 2: Average distance per octave between orig-
inal and new keypoint location in Lena image.
# KP deleted # KP created avg dist
Octave -1 812 483 3.0
Octave 0 197 190 2.6
Octave 1 580 550 3.7
Octave 2 210 220 3.2
visual distortion in the image (see Fig. 3(b)). This is not
surprising since the patch is proportional to the inverse of
the DoG kernel which vanishes at the edge of its support.
4.2 Removal Triggers Creation
A side effect of the application of this patch is the creation
of a new local extremum in the neighborhood of (x1, y1) as
indicated by a red triangle on Fig. 2(b). The choice of a
patch being not null over a relatively small region (D1 ∪
D2) stems in a concentration of the energy needed to cancel
difference d. This creates artifacts that in turn trigger the
creation of new keypoints.
Table 1 shows that this is not an isolated or random phe-
nomenon. There are almost as many new keypoints cre-
ated as deleted ones. When giving the relationship between
PSNR and keypoint removal rate, [2] not only does not count
the new keypoints, that distort the given results, but it even
does not mention their existence. In most of the cases, key-
points are not removed but indeed displaced.
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Figure 2: Effect of KPR-attack on the 5x5 neighbor-
hood of a particular keypoint (x, y, σ = 1.37): (a) orig-
inal DoG values, (b) DoG values after attack.
The next question is: what are the properties of new key-
points compared to those they replace? Fig. 4 seems to indi-
cate that the new keypoints are very close to and at the same
scale as the old ones. Of course the proximity of keypoints
is relative to their scale. We measure this spatial proximity
by computing the scale-normalized distance between origi-
nal and new keypoint locations at same scale. The average
distance over the 1,000 queries is 3.2, which proves the spa-
tial proximity of new keypoints. Detailed results per octave
for Lena are given in Table 2.
4.3 From Keypoints to Descriptors
The keypoints are used to compute descriptors over their
neighborhood, called support region. It follows that if two
keypoints are close to each other, their support regions are
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Figure 3: The KPR-based attack for a particular
keypoint (x, y, σ = 1.37): (a) patch ǫ, (b) visual dis-
tortion on image induced by ǫ patch.
very likely to be similar, and therefore their descriptors also.
Fig 5 shows this descriptor similarity when the location of
the keypoint is artificially shifted by some pixels in the di-
rection of the principal orientation of the original keypoint,
which triggers the strongest changes in the computed de-
scriptors. For high scale, keypoints must be moved farther
away to significantly change the descriptor because their
support region is larger. In the end, reducing the likelihood
of match requires to displace keypoints very far away from
their original location, and/or at a different scale. Con-
sistently with the conclusions of the previous section, the
KPR-attack of [2] fails to shift points, and this is the reason
of its inefficiency against the CBIRS.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusion is twofold. The attack proposed in [2] is
not at all a threat for CBIRS, as removing keypoints trig-
gers the creation of new and undesired ones that are easy to
match. It may, however, impact other applications of SIFT:
For instance, the KPR-attack might be efficient against some
image authentication and robust hash schemes as also con-
sidered in [2].
Our paper does not prove that CBIRS based on SIFT are
secure. There might be other dedicated attacks circumvent-
ing other bricks of the system like the description part [1].
Even the keypoint detection might be hacked, but attackers
must be very careful about the creation of new keypoints.
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